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Abstract 
Using a 2006 household survey in Mali, we compare current poverty rates and inequality levels with 
counterfactual ones in the absence of migration and remittances. With proper hypotheses on migrants 
and a selection model, we are able to impute a counterfactual income for households currently 
receiving remittances. We show that remittances reduce poverty rates by 5% to 11% and the Gini 
coefficient by about 5%. Households in the bottom quintiles are more dependent on remittances, 
which are less substitutable by additional workforce. 
Key words : Remittances, Migration, Poverty, Inequality, Africa. 
Résumé 
Cet article examine l’impact distributif des transferts des migrants au Mali, à partir de l’enquête sur les 
niveaux de vie ELIM 2006. Nous construisons différents scénarii contrefactuels qui corrigent du biais 
de sélection des ménages avec migrants. Nous montrons que les transferts des migrants internationaux 
réduisent la pauvreté de 5 à 11% au niveau national et l’indice de Gini d’environ 5%. Les niveaux de 
consommation des ménages appartenant aux quintiles les plus pauvres sont plus dépendants des 
transferts, ménages dont les revenus de substitution aux transferts restent faibles du fait de dotations en 
capital physique et humain insuffisants. 
Mots clés : Transferts, Migration, Pauvreté, Inégalité, Afrique. 
JEL Classification : F24, O15, O55 
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Introduction  
 
 
While neither migration nor migrants' remittances to friends or relatives in their origin country 
are recent phenomena, the latter has become a subject of increasing interest in the past few 
years. Official flows of migrants' remittances to developing countries have doubled between 
2002 and 2007 and, according to the World Bank, amounted to $305 billion in 2008. They 
represent a sizeable share of financial inflows to less developed countries, with an amount 
about twice as high as that of foreign aid and nearly two-thirds of foreign direct investment. 
This increase in recorded remittances not only results from the growth in the number of 
migrants, but also from better data collection and a shift from the informal to the formal sector 
in the remitting business. This in turn is the consequence of improved technologies (e.g. cell 
phone payments) to transfer small amounts of money, reduced transaction costs, and a political 
concern about informal capital flows and money laundering after the terrorist attacks of 2001. 
Still, the World Bank evaluates informal remittances to be at least 50% of the official figures, 
with a great heterogeneity across countries. According to Freund and Spatafora [2005], 
informal flows amount to 35-75% of official remittances to developing countries with Eastern 
Europe, East Asia and Sub-Saharan African countries being in the upper side of the brackets, 
and East Asia and the Pacific in the lower side. Generally speaking, the formal sector, led by 
Money Transfer Operators, such as Western Union or MoneyGram, and local banks, is much 
more developed in Latin America and East Asia than in Africa. This comes as no surprise, as 
the largest recipients of remittances are located in these regions. In absolute terms, China, India, 
Mexico and the Philippines are the countries receiving the largest amounts of remittances 
(between $17 and $27 billion, while in relative terms, Tajikistan, Moldova, Tonga, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Honduras, Lesotho, Guyana rank at the top of the list (with remittances representing 
more than 20% of GDP). The latter are very small countries, much more geographically diverse 
and their dependence on remittances comes from historical particularities, especially 
relationships with a large neighbouring country or geographic isolation.  
 
Given the size of remittances, it is worth looking at their impact on the economies of sending 
countries. In the migration process, they are considered a welfare gain, since they are part of 
migrants' extra revenue compared to what they would have earned had they stayed at home. 
However, their net effect is much more complex: they may have both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic effects.  
Macroeconomic effects concern those countries that are large enough receivers (between 4% 
and 31% of GDP, according to the World Bank) so that their exchange rate, domestic interest 
rate or balance of payment might be impacted. Like all large sources of foreign currencies 
(natural resources, top exporting sectors), remittances could lead to a phenomenon similar to 
the “Dutch Disease”' effect, with an appreciation of the domestic currency and a subsequent 
loss in competitiveness. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo [2004] point in that direction. Using data 
on 13 Latin American countries, they find that a doubling of workers' remittances would lead to 
a 22% real exchange rate appreciation. Their results are confirmed by Lopez, Molina and 
Bussolo [2007] at a global level, and Bourdet and Falk [2006], who attribute the 14% increase 
in the real exchange rate of Cape Verde in the past decade to the doubling of remittances. 
However, since remittances tend to be stable over a long period of time, evenly distributed 
across the population and spent on non-tradable goods, evidence from most countries seem to 
dismiss this negative effect. In particular, it has been argued by Rajan and Subramanian [2005] 
that remittances, contrary to other financial flows to developing countries such as international 
development assistance, have no adverse effect on growth through the real exchange rate. They 
explain it by the endogeneity of remittances: migrants stop remitting (at least in cash) when the 
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domestic exchange rate is overvalued. Moreover, as remittance inflows are usually assimilated 
to export revenues, they improve credit ratings by banks and rating agencies, so that recipient 
countries have a larger and cheaper access to credit (World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 
[2006]). Finally, when remittances are counter-cyclical, such as after a natural disaster in the 
recipient country, they help alleviating the macroeconomic cost of a shock to the economy. 
Yang [2005], using 30 years of meteorological data and an instrumental variable strategy, finds 
an insurance effect of financial flows, among which remittances are among the most reactive 
ones, raising within a year of a natural disaster. The author estimates that the increase in 
remittances cover 13% of the households' decrease in earnings within the first year after the 
hurricane and almost 28% within four years, against 26% and 21% for international aid and 
foreign direct investment respectively. Mishra [2005] finds that a 1% decrease in GDP leads to 
a 3% increase in remittances after two years in 13 Caribbean countries using data from 1980 to 
2002.  
Yet remittances are essentially small transfers of money targeted to individual households, so 
they are more suited to a microeconomic analysis. At this micro level, they might impact both 
the receiving household's income, therefore the welfare of its members, and its 
consumption/investment behaviour. For instance, Adams et al.  [2008] finds that remittance 
income in Ghana is treated as any other source of income, after controlling for systematic 
differences between recipient and non-recipient households. Remittances have nevertheless 
been found to raise productivity in Mexican rural households, probably through increased 
investment (Lopez-Feldman and Taylor, [2007]), and to help families overcome capital 
constraints and invest in livestock production in Burkina Faso (Wouterse and Taylor, [2006]). 
There is also evidence that remittances may act as an insurance device, flowing in case of an 
adverse income shock in the household or the community. Clarke and Wallsten [2003] show 
such an effect in the case of a hurricane in Jamaica: each dollar of physical damages is partly 
compensated by 25 cents of additional remittances. This could lead to the existence of moral 
hazard and reduced work incentives in households that can rely on transfers, as suggested by 
Azam and Gubert [2005]: using data collected in the Kayes area (Western Mali), they show that 
rural households receiving money from migrant workers tend to be less productive on average, 
as they know that any adverse shock on their locally-generated income will be compensated by 
those abroad.   
 
In what follows, we investigate the poverty and inequality impact of remittances in Mali. The 
choice of this country is justified by its long tradition of both short-distance and long-distance 
migration within the West African region and outside the African continent in countries as 
diverse as France or the United States. Using a survey conducted in 2006 on a nationally 
representative sample of 4,494 households, we compare the current levels of poverty and 
inequality in this country with the levels of poverty and inequality that would prevail in a 
scenario without migration and without remittances. While we adopt a methodology that is 
comparable to that used by previous authors (see, e.g., Barham and Boucher [1998]), we 
innovate in the way we compute counterfactual scenarii. Overall, we find that remittances 
reduce poverty rates by 5% to 11% and the Gini coefficient by about 5%. Our results also 
suggest that households in the bottom quintiles are more dependent on remittances, which are 
less substitutable by additional workforce. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Part 1 briefly reviews the literature investigating the poverty 
and inequality impact of remittances. Part 2 presents our empirical strategy. Part 3 describes the 
data and provides stylized facts and summary statistics on remittances in Mali. Part 4 then 
presents the results, robustness checks and discusses the limits of our empirical work. Part 5 
concludes.   
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1 Remittances, Poverty and Inequality: An Overview 
 
Remittances are initially a consequence of increased migrants' earnings and their will to share 
this extra revenue with friends and relatives or to invest in their country of origin, sometimes 
with the intention to return at some point in the future. Depending on the characteristics of 
migrants and the recipient households, remittances can substantially modify the income 
distribution. Intuitively, the poorer and less educated the migrants, the more equalizing the 
impact of remittances. This effect could be strengthened by the fact that low-skilled migrants 
could remit more, at least relatively to their income, for three main reasons: i) they tend to 
migrate alone, so they have close relatives (even a nuclear family) in the home country; ii) they 
spend on average less time in the host country, when a longer stay and progressive integration 
has been found to have a negative effect on the amount of remittances; iii) their relatives being 
poorer, they have more incentives and group pressure to remit. Empirical evidence on this 
debated issue is still inconclusive, however.  Faini [2007] and Niimi et al [2008] use cross-
country macroeconomic data and find a significantly negative impact of the share of migrants 
with tertiary education on the total amount of remittances received by country, whereas Bollard 
et al. [2009] use microdata and find that more educated migrants do remit significantly more 
than less educated migrants. Therefore the composition of the migrant population in terms of 
skills, education, social and cultural background is a key determinant of the impact of 
remittances on income and income distribution in the home country.  
 
At the macro-level, there is evidence of a negative correlation between poverty on the one hand, 
and migration and remittances on the other hand. This is for instance the result obtained by 
Adams [2003] using simple cross-country regressions. Causality has yet to be shown, however, 
since migration costs represent a powerful barrier against the migration of the poorest. As a 
result, there tends to be more migrants from lower-middle income countries, coming from the 
lower-middle part of the income distribution, since those populations are the ones who can both 
afford the cost of migration and have the most to gain from it.  
 
Using country case studies and taking proper account of the endogeneity of migration, either 
through instrumental variable techniques or panel data, are the only ways to determine the 
impact of remittances on poverty or inequality in a rigorous fashion. By contrast, a naive way to 
evaluate the net impact of remittances would be to measure poverty rates and inequality index 
after subtracting transfers from households' income. This tells us what would happen if 
remittances were to stop, with the current stock of migrants living abroad taken as given. It is 
obviously too simplistic; the two alternative scenarii would actually be the following ones: 
either people migrate and remit (or not), either they do not migrate. In the latter case, they 
would still be living in their home countries, which imply a minima participating in the labour 
force and consuming. Therefore, when trying to assess the impact of remittances, one needs to 
compare the current scenario with a counterfactual one that simulates the state of the economy 
if the current migrants were living in the country. This is the methodology that has been 
adopted since Adams [1989], based on national household surveys. Using Egyptian data, 
Adams [1989] estimates a household income function for non-migrant households based on 
aggregate factors of production, and uses the estimated coefficients to compute the income of 
migrant households under a no-migration scenario. By so doing, however, he assumes that 
migrants are randomly selected from the population, when numerous evidence point towards a 
self-selection mechanism according to individual (education, motivation), household (income, 
relationships, occupation) and community (geographic location, ethnic networks) 
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characteristics. Rodriguez [1998] goes a bit further: he assumes that all differences between 
households with and without migrants are observable or can be reduced to a constant term and 
simply estimates coefficients for the households' earnings equation, including a dummy for the 
presence of migrants, and applies them to the no-migration scenario. These coefficients are 
nevertheless likely to be biased, because it is implicitly assumed that there is no difference in 
the productivity of factors (physical and human capital) between both types of household. This 
is why Barham and Boucher [1998], followed in particular by Lachaud [1999], Adams [2006] 
and Acosta et al. [2007], adapt this idea to a model with (double) selection. Using a Heckman 
two-step estimator, they correct the earnings equation of non-migrant households by a term that 
takes into account the observable and unobservable characteristics that may be correlated with 
the decision to migrate. When possible, they also include a term that takes into account the 
probability to participate in the labour force. This makes sense as there could be a labour supply 
effect within and between households; for example, women in the absence of their husbands 
could substitute for them in their traditional occupations. The better the information on 
remitters, the finer the counterfactual. One potential issue is that most surveys only collect 
information on the amount of household income coming from foreign transfers. This implies 
making strong assumptions on the number of migrants from a given household and their 
characteristics, and could therefore weaken the results. The usual option is to assume that every 
household receiving migrants' remittances has one migrant abroad. Another potential issue is 
that while building the counterfactual scenario, general equilibrium effects are necessarily 
ignored, because it is almost impossible to determine all the consequences on the labour 
market, the demand side for consumption, credit, etc, of the migrant population. For instance, 
there might be multiplier effects of remittances, as those found in Mexico by Durand et al. 
[1996]: each dollar of remittance sent from the US to Mexico increased Mexican GDP by 
$2.90, possibly through an increase in demand that benefits the whole economy. This type of 
effect is obviously not taken into account when assessing the impact of remittances with the 
method detailed above. Indeed, such counterfactuals are not realistic; they are merely useful as 
a partial focus on substitution between remittances and local earnings within the household.  
Once a counterfactual has been computed, there only remains to compare poverty indices or 
inequality measures between the current scenario and the counterfactual one. Such estimates 
usually find that remittances decrease poverty, mainly through increased mean income, while 
measures on inequality are inconclusive, some pointing in one direction or another, depending 
on the country under concern. We could still argue that, even though remitters are usually not 
the poorest of their communities, they still belong to the world poor, so that any increase in 
their income is welcome. An alternative way to look at the impact of remittances on poverty is 
to use an exogenous shock on remittances, as in Yang and Martinez [2006]. The authors take 
advantage of the sudden appreciation of various foreign currencies against the Filipino peso 
after the 1997 Asian financial crisis to estimate the causal impact of the shock on remittances, 
household income, and poverty among Filipino origin households. They find that in migrants’ 
origin households, a 10% improvement in the exchange rate leads to a 0.6 percentage point 
decline in the poverty rate. However, this poverty-reducing impact is proven in an economic 
downturn: migrants could just be insuring their families in a difficult situation or making the 
most of a favourable interest rate to invest at home; two behaviours which would not apply in 
normal times.   
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2 Empirical Strategy 
 
In order to test the impact of remittances on poverty rates in Mali, we follow the recent 
literature and compare the current situation with a counterfactual scenario that describes as 
precisely as possible the state of the economy if the remitters had not migrated at all.1 To this 
end, we impute a counterfactual income for remittances-recipient households, based on the 
following reduced-form specification for the determinants of income: 
 
݈݋݃ ௜ܻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛ݈݋݃ܪ௜ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ ൅ ߤ௜  (1) 
 
where Yi is a measure of household non-remittances income, Hi and Xi are vectors of household 
and household head characteristics respectively, and µi is unobserved heterogeneity in income 
generation. In other words, this non-remittances income equation is a household production 
function with Hi containing factors of production such as physical assets and human capital 
measured at the household level and Xi a set of control variables associated to the age, marital 
status, sex and occupation of the household head, as well as regional dummies. We believe this 
specification to be realistic in the Malian context since a majority of households derive their 
income from collective work. Nevertheless, this production function ought to be different for 
rural and urban households, so we run separate regressions for each category. We assume a 
Cobb-Douglas form for the production function. We will interpret it differently for rural and 
urban households as the former produce an output (estimated by consumption expenditures) 
from collective work on land and the latter produce it either from a common source of income 
using all the labour force in the household, or more likely so, from the aggregation of different 
sources of income.  
Two issues need to be addressed before turning to the presentation of the data and the 
regression results. The first one relates to the computation of the counterfactual income. If 
detailed data on the number of migrants and their characteristics (sex, occupation, education, 
experience, past and current wages, countries of destination, etc.) within each household were 
available, an alternative to the above specification would be to build a counterfactual scenario 
in which migrants would be imputed the productivity of non-migrant individuals with similar 
characteristics. In the absence of such information, however, we need to make various 
assumptions about the number and the demographics of migrants. In this respect, we follow the 
literature and assume that remittances are sent by either one or two adults with completed 
primary schooling (5 years of education). In the counterfactual scenario without migration, 
household income will thus be divided by household size plus one (or two) individual to get per 
capita income.2  
The second issue relates to selectivity. If migrants were randomly selected across households in 
the country, i.e. if µi were independently identically distributed, then we would just have to run 
an OLS regression of equation (1) on non-migrant households and use the estimated 
coefficients ߙොை௅ௌ, ߚመை௅ௌ and ߛොை௅ௌ to compute the counterfactual non-remittances income of 
migrant households. However, there is strong evidence that both migrants and migrant 
households are self-selected in the population, so that µi is not i.i.d. and OLS coefficients are 
                          
1. Since not all migrants remit and some households receive remittances without having any migrant, migrant 
households and remittances-recipient households should not be treated equivalently. However, the household 
survey that is used in the empirical part of the paper does not provide information on migration per se. It only 
records remittances received from abroad. For ease of simplification,  the terms “remittances-recipient households” 
and “migrant households” are thus used indifferently in the remainder of the paper.  
2 We also allowed the migrants' characteristics to vary between urban and rural areas, assuming that those migrants 
originating from urban areas were much more educated on average than those coming from rural ones. Results 
were mostly unchanged but are available upon request.  
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inconsistent. Indeed, when migrants tend to come from more dynamic and productive 
households, using the simple OLS estimates of equation (1) underestimate the counterfactual 
income of these households (and so overestimate the migration effect), as they would use their 
factors of production more productively whether or not they migrated.  
To control for this possibility, we closely follow Barham and Boucher [1998], although we 
innovate in the way we deal with the residuals. In a first step, we model the non-remittances 
selection rule using the following probit specification: 
 
ܯ௜כ ൌ ߙ௠ ൅ ߛ௠݈݋݃ܪ௜ ൅ ߚ௠ ௜ܺ ൅ ܼ߱௜ ൅ ߤ௜   (2) 
 
where: 
 
ܯ௜ ൌ ൜
1 ݂݅ ܯ௜כ ൐ 0
0 ݂݅ ܯ௜כ ൑ 0
 
 
As it is a non-selection equation, M equals one when the household does not receive 
remittances, zero otherwise. This amounts to saying that migration is a treatment status, which 
yields two different outcomes: if a household receives remittances, it is considered as a 
“migrant household” with a production function generating an income Y1; else its production 
function has different coefficients and generates an income Y0. More formally:  
 
௜ܻ ൌ ൜
଴ܻ௜ ݂݅ ܯ௜כ ൐ 0
ଵܻ௜ ݂݅ ܯ௜כ ൑ 0
 
 
This enables us to take into account the selection on observable characteristics Hi, Xi and Zi, Zi 
being variables that are correlated with the probability to migrate but not with household 
income, as well as on unobservables contained in µi. This first step gives us the probability to 
be a non-remittance receiver, or ܲݎ݋ܾሾܯ௜כ ൐ 0ሿ ൌ Φሺߙ௠ ൅ ߛ௠݈݋݃ܪ௜ ൅ ߚ௠ ௜ܺ ൅ ܼ߱௜ሻ. From 
this probability, we compute the (non-remittances) selection inverse Mill's ratio:  
 
ߣ଴௜ ൌ
߶ሺߙ௠ ൅ ߛ௠݈݋݃ܪ௜ ൅ ߚ௠ ௜ܺ ൅ ܼ߱௜ሻ
Φሺߙ௠ ൅ ߛ௠݈݋݃ܪ௜ ൅ ߚ௠ ௜ܺ ൅ ܼ߱௜ሻ
 
 
And we compute as well the (remittances) selection inverse Mill's ratio: 
 
ߣଵ௜ ൌ
െ߶ሺߙ௠ ൅ ߛ௠݈݋݃ܪ௜ ൅ ߚ௠ ௜ܺ ൅ ܼ߱௜ሻ
1 െ Φሺߙ௠ ൅ ߛ௠݈݋݃ܪ௜ ൅ ߚ௠ ௜ܺ ൅ ܼ߱௜ሻ
 
 
We then add these terms in the earnings equations of both migrant and non-migrant households:  
 
ܧሾ݈݋݃ ଴ܻ௜|ܪ௜, ௜ܺ; ܯ௜כ ൐ 0ሿ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߛ଴݈݋݃ܪ௜ ൅ ߚ଴ ௜ܺ ൅ ߠ଴ߣ଴௜ ൅ ߳଴௜   (3) 
 
ܧሾ݈݋݃ ଵܻ௜|ܪ௜, ௜ܺ; ܯ௜כ ൑ 0ሿ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߛଵ݈݋݃ܪ௜ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺ ൅ ߠଵߣଵ௜ ൅ ߳ଵ௜  (4) 
 
Following Heckman, we estimate a parametric model, and we impose a joint normality 
distribution of the error terms:  
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൥
ߤ
ߝ଴
ߝଵ
൩ է ܰ ൥൭
0
0
0
൱ , ∑൩ 
 
with ∑ ൌ ൦
ߪఓଶ ߪఓ,ఢబ ߪఓ,ఢభ
ߪఓ,ఢబ ߪఢబ
ଶ ߪఢబ,ఢభ
ߪఓ,ఢభ ߪఢబ,ఢభ ߪఢభ
ଶ
൪ ൌ
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
1 ߩ଴ ߩଵ
ߩ଴
ఙചబ
మ
ఙഋమ
ఙചబ,ചభ
ఙഋమ
ߩଵ
ఙചబ,ചభ
ఙഋమ
ఙചభ
మ
ఙഋమ ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
 
 
We now have consistent estimates since controlling for λi allows the remaining ߳௜ to have the 
usual i.i.d. properties. The actual existence of selection in our data is then easily testable 
through a Wald Test, in which the null hypothesis is ܪ଴: ߠ෠ ൌ 0. 
We finally use the efficient coefficients ߙො଴
ை௅ௌ, ߚመ଴
ை௅ௌ
and ߛො଴
ை௅ௌ to impute the counterfactual 
income of remittances-recipient households. However, this counterfactual income has an 
artificially small variance, since it is computed from observable household characteristics only. 
One way to deal with this problem is to use the same technique as Barham and Boucher [1998] 
or Acosta et al. [2007], i.e. to add to the predicted income a random error component drawn 
from a distribution with the same mean and variance as the estimated error ߳଴̂. In order to avoid 
the results to be dependent on a particular draw, the authors replicate the estimation 1000 times, 
each time computing a counterfactual income for remittances-recipient households and the 
subsequent poverty and inequality levels. They then report the median draw of all estimates, as 
well as the 95% confidence interval bounds.  
In what follows, we adopt a slightly different strategy to deal with the error term in order to 
exploit all the available information. We know that much of the selection of migrant households 
expressed in their production function cannot be explained by observable household 
characteristics, and is contained in the residuals ߳ଵ. We can obtain estimates ߳ଵ̂ from the 
corrected equation (4). What we would like to do is to use the information contained in ߳ଵ̂ when 
imputing the counterfactual income of migrant households. That is, we would like to draw an 
߳଴כ which would not have the same properties as the estimated ߳଴̂ from equation (3) but that 
would keep the information in ߳ଵ̂. 
Since we imposed the joint normality of residuals, there exists a simple relationship between 
them. For instance:  ఢబ
ఙചబ
ൌ ߩఢబ,ఢభ ൬
ఢభ
ఙചభ
൰ ൅ ݑ where ݑ է ܰ ൬0, ට1 െ ߩఢబ,ఢభଶ ൰. Ideally, if we were 
able to estimate the correlation between ߳଴ and ߳ଵ, it would be straightforward to get the desired 
߳଴כ. However, what the Heckit estimations yield are ߩ଴ and ߩଵ, the correlations between ߤ and ߳଴ 
on the one hand, and ߤ and ߳ଵ on the other. So, from the estimated ߳ଵ̂, we obtain a measure of 
̂ߤ, through :  ఓෝ
ఙഋ
ൌ ߩଵ ൬
ఢොభ
ఙചభ
൰ ൅ ݒ where ݒ է ܰ ቀ0, ඥ1 െ ߩଵଶቁ. 
To make sure that these households were selected into migration, we impose ̂ߤ௜ to be such that 
ܯ௜כ ൑ 0 for the concerned households, by redrawing v from its normal distribution as many 
times as needed. We have therefore fully taken into account the unobservable determinants of 
receiving remittances for a household. In the counterfactual scenario, these households are not 
going to receive remittances anymore but they should keep their unobservable characteristics in 
their production function. With the same procedure, we obtain the desired ߳଴כ: 
ఢబכ
ఙചబכ
ൌ ߩ଴ ൬
ఓෝ
ఙഋ
൰ ൅
ݒԢ where ݒԢ է ܰ ቀ0, ඥ1 െ ߩ଴ଶቁ. 
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Finally, we have all the elements needed to compute the counterfactual income of remittances-
recipient households:  
 
ܧሾ݈݋݃ ଴ܻ௜כ |ܪ௜, ௜ܺ; ܯ௜כ ൑ 0ሿ ൌ ߙො଴ை௅ௌ ൅ ߛො଴ை௅ௌ݈݋݃ܪ௜ ൅ ߚመ଴ை௅ௌ ௜ܺ ൅ ߳଴௜כ  (5) 
 
Because our results are still dependent on particular draws of v and v', we repeat the process 
100 times, computing counterfactual incomes, poverty rates and Gini coefficients every time, in 
order to get robust values and confidence intervals at the 5% level.  
 
For comparison purpose, our results will be presented together with those that we would have 
obtained had we adopted either the naïve methodology or that of Barham and Boucher.3 
 
 
3 Data and Summary Statistics 
 
3.1 Dataset  
 
We use data from the “Enquête Légère Intégrée auprès des Ménages” (ELIM), a nationally 
representative household budget survey that was conducted in Mali between June and 
December 2006. This survey collected detailed information on consumption, income including 
transfers and remittances, credit, savings, gifts, assets, household members' characteristics as 
well as subjective opinions on welfare and politics for 4,494 households (40,810 individuals).  
 
3.2 Remittances in Mali 
 
Using the year-wise amount of remittances received from abroad as declared by the respondents 
of the ELIM 2006 survey and the appropriate extrapolation weights, total remittances are 
evaluated at FCFA 90 billion for year 2005-2006 (3.7% of GDP). At the euro-dollar exchange 
rate that was prevailing at that time, this suggests that total remittances in dollar terms 
amounted to 217 million, a figure that is very close to the one provided by the IMF’s Balance of 
Payment Yearbook.  
 
The distribution of remittances by region is shown by Figure 1. Only remittances from abroad 
are accounted for. As the main source of Malian migrants to France, the Kayes area is 
accordingly the main recipient of remittances from abroad: almost half of all remittance flows 
to Mali goes to households residing in this region. Mopti and Bamako also stand out as two 
large receivers. 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of remittances received from abroad by region, Mali 2006. 
                          
3  We know from previous evidence that migration-cum-remittances has an impact on the labour supply and 
earnings outcomes of those left behind. Ideally, our estimated model should thus be a model of double-selection, 
where the two selection rules model the choice of migration together with the choice of labour force participation 
by non-migrants. However, given the lack of data on labour suply, we could not estimate such a model.   
11 
 
Source: ELIM 2006, authors’ computations. 
 
The particular situation of Kayes also stands out in terms of the number of remittances-recipient 
households, and in terms of the share of remittances in household consumption (Table 1): 
almost 43% of people living in the Kayes area receive remittances, about twice the national 
average. In addition, remittances sent to this region represent 26% of remittances-recipient 
households’ consumption that is to say almost 11% of all households’ consumption 
(respectively 18% and 4% at the national level). The case of Mopti is also worth discussing. 
With around 36% of inhabitants living in remittances-recipient households, the region is also 
strongly involved in international migration. However, the destination of international migrants 
from this region being mostly within the African continent, households receive much less on 
average as a share of their consumption than those of Kayes. 
  
Bamako
16%
Kayes 
41%Koulikoro
7%
Mopti
16%
Segou
8%
Sikasso
7%
Tombouctou/ 
Gao/Kidal
5%
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Table 1 – Percentage of remittances-recipient households and amount of remittances by region, 2006 
 Percentage of  
individuals living in 
remittances-recipient 
households 
Remittances as a share of 
total consumption (%)
Remittances per capita 
(in 1,000 FCFA) 
Sub-sample of 
remittances-
recipient households 
All 
sample 
Sub-sample of 
remittances-
recipient households 
All 
sample 
 National 22.7 18.0 4.0 33 7 
    Urban   19.4 21.3 4.1 63 12 
    Rural 24.0 16.7 3.9 22 5 
Bamako 19.0 17.1 3.1 61 11 
Kayes  42.7 26.3 10.8 55 22 
Koulikoro 18.4 12.7 2.3 20 4 
Mopti 35.7 13.3 4.7 17 6 
Segou 8.7 26.9 2.2 45 4 
Sikasso 12.7 15.3 1.9 24 3 
Tomb/Gao/Kidal 21.2 14.9 3.1 24 5 
Source: ELIM 2006, authors’ computations. 
 
More generally speaking, the percentage of individuals relying on remittance income is higher 
in rural areas, but the amount they get as a share of their consumption is smaller. This can 
partly result from differences in the cost of living, or in the skill level of migrants: migrants 
from urban areas may have higher skills indeed than migrants from rural areas, get higher 
wages in the host country and may thus be able to remit more. This is straightforward in our 
database, from which we can impute that 83% of high school or university graduates live in 
urban areas. Social pressure may be another explanation: migrants from rural areas may have 
pressure to remit to more people in their extended community, so they may have to divide what 
they save to remit into more but smaller pieces. Having less constraints to give outside their 
families, migrants from urban areas may be able to remit more, but to less households.  
 
The main insight from Table 1 is that the country is not really dependent on remittances, which 
barely amount to 4% of total household consumption, and about the same share of official 
GDP. We are far from the situation of Tajikistan (36% of GDP), Haiti (22%) or even Gambia 
(13%). However, as remittances are directed to only 20% of households and very unequally 
distributed, some households may be heavily impacted by this income flow from abroad. For 
instance, remittances represent on average 18% of remittances-recipient households’ 
consumption at the level of the country, 26% in Kayes, and as much as 40% for urban 
households in Segou. This is somewhat less than what Lachaud [1999] finds for Burkina Faso, 
though that was before the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, when there were thousands of West African 
migrants working in the dynamic agricultural export sector. Still, it is likely that without this 
source of income, remittances-recipient households would have to reduce their consumption 
drastically and could eventually fall into poverty.  
 
It is now of interest to look at the distribution of remittances by quintile of per capita 
consumption to have an idea of their importance in the income distribution. In absolute terms, 
the upper quintile gets a disproportionately high share of remittances, almost half of the total 
flows (Figure 2). In relative terms, though, remittances to the fifth quintile only account for 
4.7% of remittances-recipient households’ consumption expenditures, which is only slightly 
more than the average (Table 2). This figure varies between 2.8% and 4.7% across quintiles, so 
that remittances do not seem to discriminate poorer households or to have a decisive impact on 
income distribution.  
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Figure 2: Proportion of remittances by quintile of consumption per capita, Mali 2006. 
 
Source: ELIM 2006, authors’ computations. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Mean share of remittances in total consumption by quintile of consumption per capita (%), 2006. 
Quintile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total 
Mean share of remittances in total consumption (%) 3.0 2.8 4.6 3.7 4.7 4.0 
Source: ELIM 2006, authors’ computations. 
 
Last, it is interesting to compare our findings with figures computed from the “Enquête 
Malienne de Conjoncture Economique et Sociale” (EMCES), a survey conducted in Mali on a 
nationally representative sample of households twelve years or so before ELIM 2006 (see 
Gubert [2000]). At the country level, the percentage of remittances-recipient households has 
increased from 16.7% to 19.4%, with important regional differences.  In Kayes for instance, it 
went up from 28.1% to 38.6%; in Mopti, from 18.6% to 28.9% and in Bamako from 5.6% to 
16%. This last result confirms an increasing trend of urban emigration. The share of remittances 
in total household consumption (for recipient households only) has also markedly increased in 
all regions but Kayes, where it was already close to 25% in 1994. It doubled in Mopti or 
Sikasso and more than tripled in Segou.4  
 
 
3.3 Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
 
Names and definitions of the variables used in the regressions are reported in Table 3, together 
with summary statistics computed on the sub-sample of remittances-recipient (or migrant) 
households (column 1), on the sub-sample of non-migrant households (column 2) and on the 
whole sample (last column). 20 observations were dropped due to the lack of data on 
consumption expenditures. 
 
                          
4  These increases are likely to be underestimated since EMCES 1994 collected no data on self-consumed 
production. As a result, the consumption aggregate computed from this survey is underestimated, leading to an 
artificially high share of remittances in total household consumption for this year.  
Q 1 
6% Q 2
9%
Q 3
15%
Q 4
21%
Q 5
49%
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While we have both data on consumption and income, consumption (including home-produced 
goods) is generally found to be a more reliable indicator than income (Deaton [1997]). This 
explains why the consumption impact of remittances will be the focus of our analysis.5 The 
consumption aggregate is computed using detailed lists of goods consumed by each household 
and valued at prices provided by the respondents. Such a recording may lead to issues of 
misreporting but no national consistent price system could serve as an alternative. The 
advantage of this method is that it takes regional price differences into account in households' 
real income. Note that in what follows, the terms “consumption” and “income” will be used 
interchangeably. 
 
The regressors of equation (1) can be grouped into two categories, with factors of production 
such as physical assets and human capital on the one hand and control variables relating to the 
household head and to place of residence on the other hand. In the former group, the “asset” 
variable is an asset score, ranging from 1 to 3.34. It is computed using the weight of seven 
assets, namely car, motorcycle, bike, boat, computer, phone and sewing machine, derived from 
a principal component analysis. The minimum of land ownership was set at 0.01 instead of 0 
for the consistency of the log, without loss of generality. We disaggregated household size by 
age group to have an idea of the typical household in Mali: it is usually very large, with an 
average of nearly 9 members, and young, with half of the members having less than 25 years 
old. This disaggregation is also aimed at accounting for differences in productivity levels 
between household members. Our measure of human capital is the total number of years of 
education completed by all household members aged 15 to 60. Turning to the control variables, 
we set the Sikasso region as the default category, and merged the three regions of Tombouctou, 
Gao and Kidal, which are under-represented in the survey sample and have similar geographic, 
demographic and economic characteristics, under a single dummy.  
Summary statistics by migratory status show that remittances-recipient households are on 
average larger in all age groups and richer whatever the chosen indicator: they consume more, 
have more assets and cultivate and own more land. Migrant households are also more often 
female-headed, more often polygamous, and their head is less likely to work in the formal 
sector.  
Let us now turn to a description of the variables affecting migration and/or the receipt of 
remittances. The vector of variables Z is essential for the identification of our model. If the 
variables in equation (1) and (2) were indeed the same, there would be an issue of collinearity 
when measuring ܧሾ݈݋ܻ݃|ܯכ ൐ 0ሿ and the model would be unidentified. Selecting correct 
instruments for migration is a tough problem in the whole literature on migration. A common 
option when dealing with ethnic-based networks of migrants is to use some measures of ethnic 
affiliation or geographic concentration, such as in Adams et al. [2008] or Lachaud [1999]. This 
is particularly relevant in the case of Mali, where migrants are influenced by ethnic networks in 
their migration decision and destination, in particular the Soninke in France (see Azam and 
Gubert [2005]). We thus computed from the 1998 Population Census the share of each of the 
four main ethnic groups by “district” (arrondissement) and use these variables as instruments 
for the probability of receiving remittances. The implicit assumption here is that these variables 
measured in 1998 are correlated with the probability to receive remittances in 2006 but not with 
observed household consumption in 2006. 
 
 
 
 
                          
5 Another reason for using consumption instead of income is that the poverty line that will be used in the paper to 
separate poor from non-poor households is based on consumption data. 
15 
Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
Remittances-
recipient 
households 
(n =  843) 
Non-migrant 
households 
 
(n= 3,631) 
All 
households 
 
(n= 4,474) 
Regressors Mean Std.  dev. Mean 
Std.  
dev. Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Consumption per capita (FCFA 1,000) 208 179  193  182  196 182 
Household consumption (FCFA 1,000) 1,876  2,106 1,426 1,888 1,514 1,940 
Household size  10.13 6.95 8.36 5.28 8.70 5.68 
Owned hectares of cultivated land 4.36 6.07 3.82 9.46 3.92 8.90 
Asset score 1.65 0.62 1.61 0.65 1.61 0.65 
 Number of household members…            
     aged 60 years old or more 0.56 0.75 0.37 0.65 0.41 0.68 
     aged 25 to 60 years old 3.02 2.30 2.47 1.54 2.58 1.73 
     aged 15 to 25 years old 1.92 2.06 1.46 1.57 1.55 1.69 
     aged 15 or less 2.60 2.51 2.29 2.12 2.35 2.20 
Aggregated years of education per household 8.22 14.31 7.64 12.76 7.75 13.08 
Household head works in the formal sector (dummy) 0.10 0.30 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.36 
Household head is a female (dummy) 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 
Polygamous household (dummy) 0.33 0.47 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 
Age of household head 52.00 14.94 48.10 13.63 48.86 13.98 
Household lives in Kayes (dummy) 0.25 0.43 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.33 
Household lives in Koulikoro (dummy) 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 
Household lives in Sikasso (dummy) 0.09 0.28 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.36 
Household lives in Segou (dummy) 0.06 0.24 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.37 
Household lives in Mopti (dummy) 0.26 0.44 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38 
Household lives in Tombouctou/Gao/Kidal (dummy) 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 
Household lives in Bamako(dummy) 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.33 
Instruments Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Fraction of the population in the district(*)  having…       
    Maraka or Soninké as mother tongue language 7.58 17.45 5.36 14.51 5.92 15.57 
    Sonrhai or Djerma as mother tongue language 6.95 16.53 6.26 15.76 6.20 15.70 
    Bambara or Malinké as mother tongue language 35.29 31.49 36.0 31.26 35.71 31.27 
    Peul or Foulfoubé as mother tongue language 9.01 13.79 8.28 13.26 8.25 13.20 
Source: ELIM 2006, RGP 1998, authors’ computations. (*) Households in the sample are located in 214 districts. 
in the sample. 
 
 
4 Results  
 
4.1 Heckman two-step estimates  
 
Econometric estimates of equations (3) and (4) are contained in Tables 4 and 5 for rural and 
urban households respectively. 
 
Looking first at our selection equation, regression results confirm the validity of our 
instruments: most of the ethnic concentration variables for rural and urban samples are indeed 
statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level. The concentration of Maraka and Soninke by 
district in 1998 is positively correlated to the probability of migrating and/or receiving 
remittances for both rural and urban households, as well as the concentration of Sonrai and 
Djerma, who are natives of the Mopti region but for rural households only. Turning to the other 
regressors, many variables that belong to vectors H and X are not significant, though we have to 
use them for identification purposes. Nevertheless, those which are significant confirm intuitive 
interpretations. Coefficients of the variables relating to household wealth, for instance, such as 
the asset score and the quantity of land owned and cultivated by the household are positive and 
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significant in the migration selection equation for both urban and rural samples. This suggests 
that migration is costly and favoured by initial wealth, and some would-be migrants may be 
financially constrained. By contrast, the probability of migrating and/or receiving remittances is 
lower when the household head works in the formal sector. This makes sense as far as working 
in the formal sector implies a higher status and wage, less volatility in earnings, additional 
opportunities for other household members, and so less incentives to migrate. In urban areas, 
female-headed households are more likely to receive remittances than male-headed ones, which 
we can interpret as mothers and wives' reliance on migrants' abroad. In both rural and urban 
areas, polygamy is correlated with the probability of receiving remittances. Two reasons may 
explain this last result. First, polygamous household have logically more members, so it is less 
costly for them to send some members away, and it achieves higher efficiency in terms of 
diversification. Second, it could be that migrant households are richer, and consequently more 
likely to count many dependents. Finally, regional dummies are found to have strong effects on 
the probability to migrate and/or receive remittances. In particular, rural households residing in 
Kayes and Mopti are much more likely to receive remittances. This suggests that all else equal, 
there is a strong propensity to migrate from these regions, due to past migration experience and 
well-developed networks of migrants abroad, especially in France and other African countries. 
By contrast, rural households residing in Segou are less likely to migrate and/or receive 
remittances. In the case of urban households, the most prone to migrate seem to be those 
households residing in Mopti and Tombouctou.  
 
Let us now turn to the results of the consumption equations. Evidence of a selection on non-
observables among non-migrant households is provided by the test on ߠ෡ , the coefficient of the 
inverse Mill's ratio (the “lambda”). For non-migrant households, the selection control variable 
is indeed significant, suggesting a positive correlation between the error terms of the 
(non)migration selection equation on the one hand and the error terms of the consumption 
equation on the other hand. The rest of the coefficients have the expected signs. In particular, 
household demographic variables are found to be positively correlated with aggregate 
consumption, similarly as our measure for education and the dummy taking value 1 if the 
household head is employed in the formal sector. By contrast, female-headed households are 
found to consume significantly less. Surprisingly enough, the quantity of land cultivated and 
owned by the household is not or barely significant in the regression run on the rural sample. 
We believe that the data on land ownership is not accurate, firstly because land ownership in 
rural Sahelian countries is not well defined, blurred by community rights and other extra-
juridical traditions; secondly because farmers themselves have little idea of how much land they 
use. Finally, the age and age square of the household head are not significant in the urban 
sample, despite being a popular control in the literature.  
 
 
4.2 Poverty and Inequality Impact  
 
This section takes the next step in constructing the poverty headcounts and Gini coefficients for 
household consumption by imputing household consumption in the no-migration 
counterfactual. In what follows, we model three counterfactual scenarii to migration and 
remittances:  
 
• Counterfactual 1 or “naïve”: we simply subtract remittances from total consumption for 
remittances-recipient households; 
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• Counterfactual 2: we impute the consumption of remittances-recipient households  
using the same methodology as the one adopted by Barham and Boucher [1998] and 
Acosta et al. [2007]; 
 
• Counterfactual 3: we impute the consumption of remittances-recipient households using 
the same methodology as the one adopted by Barham and Boucher [1998], but 
innovating in the way we deal with residuals. 
 
Every remittances-recipient household is further assumed to have one adult migrant abroad 
with five years of completed years of education. Whatever the no-migration counterfactual 
scenario, household consumption is thus divided by household size plus one individual to get 
per capita consumption. The assumption on the number of migrants per remittances-recipient 
household may be considered to be a strong and conservative one as the World Bank estimated 
at 1,213,042 the number of Malians living abroad in 2006. Assuming one migrant per 
remittances-recipient household amounts to 274,871 migrants at the level of the country. For 
this reason, our estimates should be considered as lower-bond estimates.6 
 
Tables 6 and 7 report simulations of the effects of remittances and migration on poverty and 
inequality  levels. Table 6 presents poverty rates using the Malian official poverty line which is 
based on the cost-of-basic-needs method. This method consists in computing a food poverty 
line that is defined as the level of expenditures necessary to achieve an intake requirement of 
2,450 calories per person per day. This poverty line is then scaled up to include a non-food 
component, by determining the average level of total expenditure of those people whose food 
expenditures are just equal to the food poverty line. This method has been applied for each 
region and area of Mali in order to control for regional differences in prices and consumption 
patterns, resulting in 18 distinct poverty lines.7 Table 7 shows estimates of the Gini coefficient 
together with mean consumption per capita by quintile.   
     
  
                          
6 We also run the simulations assuming that remittances-recipient households have two migrants instead of one, 
but our results remained basically unchanged. 
7 Even if Delarue et al. [2008] criticized the way this poverty line has been calculated, which strongly 
overestimates poverty rates in the Sikasso region, we decided to use this poverty line to be able to compare our 
results with official Malian poverty indicators.  
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Table 4: Heckman two-step estimates for rural households 
 Non-migrant households 
(n=2,340) 
Migrant households  
(n= 548) 
     
 E(logC/no 
migration) 
P(not 
migrating) 
E(logC/ 
migration) 
P( migra-
ting) 
Area of cultiv. land owned by household (log) -0.007 -0.089 0.030 0.065 
 (1.00) (4.73)*** (1.93)* (3.44)*** 
Asset score (log) 0.372 -0.048 0.506 0.169 
 (7.14)*** (0.39) (5.66)*** (1.32) 
Number of household members aged…     
    … 60 or more (log) 0.070 -0.098 0.230 0.068 
 (1.10) (0.71) (2.41)** (0.48) 
    … between 25 and 60 (log) 0.328 -0.007 0.328 0.041 
 (11.71)*** (0.11) (7.08)*** (0.62) 
    … between 15  and 25 (log) 0.214 -0.095 0.160 0.114 
 (8.83)*** (1.73)* (4.23)*** (2.02)** 
    …less than 15 years (log) 0.253 0.043 0.232 -0.048 
 (12.06)*** (0.87) (6.59*** (0.95) 
Total education in household (log) 0.038 -0.019 0.069 0.024 
 (3.17)*** (0.67) (3.34)*** (0.81) 
Polygamous household 0.059 -0.114 0.079 0.135 
 (2.04)** (1.72)* (1.63) (1.97)** 
Household head is a female -0.218 0.197 0.028 -0.130 
 (3.74)*** (1.33) (0.26) (0.85) 
Household  head works in the formal sector 0.132 0.188 0.254 -0.298 
 (2.45)*** (1.30) (1.97)** (1.93)** 
Age of household head -0.012 -0.006 0.006 0.010 
 (2.38)** (0.52) (0.64) (0.78) 
Age square of household head 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.36)** (0.34) (0.71) (0.48) 
Household lives in Kayes 0.242 -0.428 0.372 0.493 
 (5.22)*** (3.81)*** (3.76)*** (4.191)*** 
Household lives in Koulikoro 0.202 0.104 0.161 0.037 
 (5.28)*** (0.99) (2.00)** (0.34) 
Household lives in Segou 0.222 0.304 0.094 -0.314 
 (5.62)*** (2.75)*** (0.91) (2.73)*** 
Household lives in Mopti 0.018 -0.832 0.045 0.932 
 (0.36) (6.45)*** (0.48) (6.41)*** 
Household lives in Tombouctou/Gao/Kidal 0.194 -0.351 0.124 0.165 
 (3.86)*** (1.50) (1.25) (0.67) 
% of people in district with…     
   … Maraka or Soninke as a mother language  -0.021  0.018 
  (8.43)***  (6.21)*** 
   … Sonrai or Djerma as a mother language  -0.008  0.011 
  (2.02)**  (2.56)*** 
   …Bambara or Malinke as a mother language  -0.003  0.000 
  (1.67)*  (0.08) 
   … Peul or Foulfoube as a mother language  -0.003  -0.005 
  (1.27)  (1.88)* 
Intercept 13.047 1.733 12.862 -1.809 
 (97.33)*** (5.25)*** (42.74)*** (5.05)*** 
Lambda  0.482 
(0.022)*** 
  -0.0758 
(0.080)    
  
Log-likelihood -2,981.8  -1,570.3  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Heckman two-step estimates for urban households 
 Non-migrant households 
(n=1,290) 
Migrant households  
(n=286) 
     
 E(logC/no 
migration) 
P(not 
migrating) 
E(logC/ 
migration) 
P( migra-
ting) 
Asset score (log) 0.613 -0.365 0.767 0.414 
 (9.90)*** (2.16)** (5.65)*** (2.46)** 
Number of household members aged…     
    … 60 or more (log) 0.109 -0.130 -0.037 0.161 
 (1.19) (0.64) (0.25) (0.77) 
    … between 25 and 60 (log) 0.271 -0.088 0.328 0.097 
 (7.66)*** (1.02) (5.25)*** (1.13) 
    … between 15  and 25 (log) 0.110 -0.054 0.281 0.074 
 (3.71)*** (0.71) (4.85)*** (0.98) 
    …less than 15 years (log) 0.222 -0.038 0.169 0.065 
 (8.67)*** (0.57) (3.24)*** (0.98) 
Total education in household (log) 0.111 -0.017 0.022 -0.013 
 (7.78)*** (0.44) (0.76) (0.33) 
Polygamous household 0.079 -0.019 0.073 0.025 
 (1.93)* (0.19) (0.92) (0.24) 
Household head is a female -0.063 -0.163 -0.089 0.222 
 (1.28) (1.37) (0.94) (1.84)* 
Household head works in the formal sector 0.056 0.222 0.054 -0.220 
 (1.71)* (2.46)** (0.65) (2.38)** 
Age of household head 0.010 0.003 -0.017 -0.007 
 (1.44) (0.17) (1.11) (0.38) 
Age square of household head -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.13) (0.73) (1.07) (0.97) 
Household lives in Kayes 0.129 -0.191 0.385 0.304 
 (1.94)* (0.89) (2.37)** (1.38) 
Household lives in Koulikoro 0.021 -0.039 0.363 0.041 
 (0.37) (0.21) (2.51)** (0.22) 
Household lives in Segou -0.064 0.017 0.004 -0.082 
 (1.21) (0.10) (0.03) (0.48) 
Household lives in Mopti 0.090 -0.462 0.131 0.589 
 (1.44) (1.81)* (0.86) (2.12)** 
Household lives in Tombouctou/Gao/Kidal 0.054 
(0.94) 
-0.831 
(2.10)** 
0.167 
(1.08) 
0.905 
(2.07)** 
Household lives in Bamako 0.186 0.036 0.460 -0.036 
 (3.67)*** (0.21) (3.44)*** (0.21) 
% of people in district with…     
   … Maraka or Soninke as a mother language  -0.043  0.038 
  (5.22)***  (4.30)*** 
   … Sonrai or Djerma as a mother language  0.001  -0.000 
  (0.18)  (0.07) 
   …Bambara or Malinke as a mother language  -0.012  0.014 
  (2.23)**  (2.25)** 
   … Peul or Foulfoube as a mother language  -0.016  0.013 
  (2.18)**  (1.63) 
Intercept 12.633 2.478 13.632 -2.505 
 (70.29)*** (4.51)*** (28.91)*** (4.20)*** 
Lambda  0.361 
(0.0469)*** 
  -0.141 
(0.130) 
 
Log-likelihood -1,549.2  -887.8  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Poverty impact of remittances 
 Observed Counterfactual 1 
“naïve” 
Counterfactual 2 
Barham and 
Boucher 
Counterfactual 3 
Barham and 
Boucher 
“modified” 
Poverty rate (%)     
 National 46.4 
[43.6 - 49.3] 
51.4 
[48.7 – 54.1] 
51.2 
[50.4 – 51.8] 
48.8 
[47.9 – 49.7] 
    Urban   27.3 
[23.1 – 31.5] 
32.2 
[27.7 – 36.8] 
30.7 
[29.6 – 32.0] 
30.0 
[28.9 – 31.2] 
    Rural 55.3 
[51.4 – 59.3] 
60.4 
[56.9 – 63.9] 
60.7 
[59.4 – 61.7] 
57.7 
[56.5 – 59.0] 
Bamako 12.4 
[7.4 – 17.4] 
16.2 
[10.6 – 21.8] 
15.0 
[12.7 – 16.9] 
15.7 
[13.6 – 18.0] 
Kayes  40.6 
[33.7 – 47.5] 
53.4 
[47.4 – 59.4] 
54.0 
[51.2 – 57.0] 
43.3 
[41.0 – 45.9] 
Koulikoro 40.5 
[34.7 – 46.2] 
43.7 
[39.0 – 49.4] 
43.2 
[41.4 – 44.8] 
42.2 
[40.4 – 43.6] 
Mopti 45.6 
[35.6 – 55.7] 
53.4 
[44.4 – 62.3] 
55.4 
[51.3 – 58.2] 
52.0 
[48.8 – 55.5] 
Segou 49.2 
[44.2 – 54.1] 
51.1 
[45.8 – 56.4] 
50.0 
[48.7 – 51.2] 
49.3 
[48.5 – 50.5] 
Sikasso 81.8 
[76.6 – 87.1] 
83.0 
[77.8 – 88.2] 
82.2 
[81.1 – 83.1] 
81.5 
[80.5 – 82.5] 
Tombouctou Gao Kidal 22.8 
[17.0 – 28.5] 
28.2 
[21.8 – 34.6] 
25.7 
[23.6 – 28.1] 
26.6 
[24.7 – 29.1] 
 Share of poor 
(%) 
Thousands of additional poor  
 National 100 617 592 296 
    Urban   18.6 190 132 105 
    Rural 81.4 430 454 202 
Bamako 2.7 48 32 41 
Kayes  11.8 212 222 45 
Koulikoro 13.1 59 50 31 
Mopti 19.2 187 235 154 
Segou 16.9 37 16 2 
Sikasso 33.2 28 9 -7 
Tombouctou Gao Kidal 3.1 50 27 35 
 
Results in Table 6 show that poverty would be significantly more severe whatever the 
simulation and whatever the region under concern. In Mali as a whole, the increase would range 
from 2.4 to 5 percentage points depending on the simulation, with large regional disparities.  
Interestingly enough, there are significant differences between our first, second and third 
counterfactuals. Not surprisingly, the naïve counterfactual gives the most optimistic impact of 
remittances on poverty: around 620,000 individuals are found to escape from poverty thanks to 
remittances. Once the migrants’ potential earnings in Mali is accounted for, the estimated 
impact is less strong with the number of additional poor falling from either 620,000 to 590,000 
or 620,000 to 300,000 depending on the way the income generated by return migrants is 
estimated. Overall, the decrease in poverty indicators is higher when we adopt exactly the same 
methodology as the one used by Barham and Boucher than when we modify it so as to make 
use of all the information contained in the residuals. This suggests that counterfactual 2 over-
estimates the poverty-impact of remittances by not fully taking into account the remittances-
recipient households’ unobservable characteristics. 
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In relative terms, the poverty increase would be higher in urban areas (+10%) than in rural areas 
(+4%). These results are in line with those found by Lachaud (1999) in Burkina Faso.8 
According to our third estimate, the increase in poverty without migration would be particularly 
severe in the regions of Bamako (+27%), Tombouctou-Gao-Kidal (+17%) and Mopti (+14%). 
In the region of Kayes, the poverty impact of migration is less significant (7%). This 
unexpected result suggests that remittances-recipient households in this region are not the 
poorest ones as these households have unobservable characteristics (probably because of the 
long tradition of migration) that make them more productive on average than remittances-
recipient households residing in other regions of the country.  
We thus have substantial evidence that remittances play a poverty-reducing role, which we can 
interpret in the following way: on average, the net consumption gain from migration for those 
who stay is the sum of what the migrant remits, what he would have consumed had he decided 
to stay, minus what he would have earned had he not migrated. This is indeed a gain, as it is 
positive.  
 
The next question is the following one: are households differently affected across the income 
distribution? In Table 7, the population is split into five groups according to their counterfactual 
per capita consumption. In counterfactual 3, migration and remittances are found to have a clear 
equalizing effect: the lower the quintile, the higher the gain in average consumption through 
remittances. The upper quintile is actually losing in average consumption through migration. In 
other words, poorer households are found to receive more from their migrant workers than what 
these workers would have earned had they stayed in Mali. The reverse happens for those 
households located in the upper part of the income distribution. This last result is confirmed by 
our computation of the Gini coefficients. As shown by the third part of table 7 indeed, the no-
migration counterfactuals produce Gini coefficients that are slightly higher than the Gini for the 
observed income distribution with migration and remittances, even though differences are not 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that migration and remittances have an 
equalizing impact on income distribution. This result is in accordance with Acosta et al. [2007] 
who find that remittances reduce inequality in Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru.  
  
                          
8 Lachaud’s estimated changes are nevertheless much higher on average (+39% in urban areas and +17% in rural 
areas). This might be due to his adoption of Barham and Boucher’s methodology. 
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Table 7: Inequality impact of remittances 
 Observed Counterfactual 1 
“naïve” 
Counterfactual 2 
Barham and 
Boucher 
Counterfactual 3 
Barham and 
Boucher 
“modified” 
Consumption per capita (1,000 FCFA)   
  Mean  174  162  163  
[161  – 164] 
175  
[172 – 180] 
  Quintile     
    Q1 66 63 62 
[60  – 63] 
61 
[60  – 63] 
    Q2 109 104 103   
[103 – 104] 
104 
[103  – 105] 
    Q3  151 141 144 
[143 – 146] 
147 
[145 – 148] 
    Q4 214 200 206 
[204  – 209] 
212 
[210  – 214] 
    Q5 446 407 421 
[417  – 428] 
462 
[452 – 486] 
Variation (%)     
    National mean  -6,9% -6,3% 0,6% 
    Q1  -4,5% -6,1% -7,6% 
    Q2  -4,6% -5,5% -4,6% 
    Q3  -6,6% -4,6% -2,6% 
    Q4   -6,5% -3,7% -0,9% 
    Q5  -8,7% -5,6% 3,6% 
Gini index     
    National 37.6 
[36.2 – 41.0] 
38.1 
[36.1 – 40.8] 
37.8 
[37.4 – 38.2] 
39.3 
[38.5 – 40.5] 
    Urban   33.9 
[30.9 – 39.8] 
34.4 
[31.3 – 38.4] 
33.4 
[32.9 – 34.0] 
36.2 
[35.3 – 37.7] 
    Rural 33.5 
[31.1 – 36.1] 
34.2 
[32.5 – 36.6] 
34.0 
[33.4 – 34.5] 
36.3 
[35.3 – 37.7] 
 
 
4.3 Limits 
 
Our results may suffer from several limits that are now briefly discussed.  
 
First, our counterfactual imputed income for remittances-recipient households could be 
underestimated if those households proved to be much more productive than others. 
Econometrically, it means that the coefficients ߙ,ෝ  ߚመand ߛො that we imputed to remittances-
recipient households in the no-remittance scenario are too small, even after controlling for a 
selection on unobservables. As suggested by the estimated coefficients of the income equations 
(Tables 3 and 4), there is actually some evidence of significant differences in factor 
productivity between migrant and non-migrant households. So in the counterfactual scenarii 2 
and 3, while these households are supposed to lose at most the current share of remittances in 
their income, since additional members should bring additional revenues, they might be losing 
more by being imputed wrong coefficients. This intuition is confirmed when looking at the 
average amount of factors of production of household receiving remittances versus others, in 
Table 3. The formers have better endowments, implying that they make a more productive use 
of their endowments. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that what we considered as 
self-selection into migration is in fact a consequence of migration. In other words, households 
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receiving remittances are more productive because they have been receiving remittances for 
several years, therefore have been able to invest in physical and human capital, raising both 
their wealth and productivity above that of other households. In this case, our selection model is 
not exactly the good one, but it does not mean that migrants are randomly selected either, just 
that our selection effect includes characteristics that are consequences and not causes of 
migration.  
 
Second, we have made various assumptions on remitters to build the counterfactual. However, 
it is not clear-cut whether we should count one, two or more remitters per household, and 
whether we should only take remitters into account in the counterfactual instead of the whole 
migrant population. As a matter of fact, families know that the probability of receiving 
remittances when sending a member abroad is not one, and this must be part of their migration 
decision. Following this line of reasoning, it would make sense to consider the 1.2 million 
Malian emigrants in order to build a more realistic counterfactual. Unfortunately, the way we 
should allocate them between households is hard to tell.  
 
Third, while we only considered selection in the migration choice, it is likely that labour force 
participants are non-randomly selected as well. If this were indeed the case, this would require 
the inclusion of two selection criteria in our specification as in Barham and Boucher [1998]: the 
migration choice and the labour force decision. The presence or absence of one or two adult 
males in a household is indeed likely to affect the labour force participation decision of other 
members, especially women. The functioning of the Malian labour market and the nature of the 
information contained in the survey make it impossible, however, to have a correct measure of 
labour force decision, which is why we leave it aside. 
 
Last, another issue is the validity of building such a counterfactual instead of a general 
equilibrium model. The higher the number of migrants imputed to households, the more heroic 
the “everything else equal” assumption, as increasing artificially a country's population by 2.5% 
to 10% ought to have big effects on the labour market, education and returns to education, total 
demand and supply, imports and credit. In this perspective, we should simulate a whole 
economy, or include by a loop the general equilibrium effects of a microeconomic change, as in 
Heckman, Lochner and Taber [1998]. This however could not be done with our data set. 
 
 
5 Conclusion  
 
Running a standard Heckman two-step estimation to control for selection on both observable 
and unobservable characteristics of remittances-recipient households in Mali, we have 
computed a counterfactual income for these households, in a scenario under which migrants had 
not migrated and would be still living with their families, earning their living and consuming 
within the household. Since we have very little information on migrants, we have assumed that 
there was one migrant with primary level of education per household. This assumption is a 
conservative one, so that our results are likely to be lower-bond estimates.  
 
Our results show that remittances significantly decrease the number of poor in Mali, especially 
in regions where the dependence on remittance income is the highest such as in the Mopti 
region. They also show that inequality is reduced thanks to migrants’ transfers. However, the 
poverty and inequality impact of remittances depends on the assumptions we made to compute 
our counterfactual scenario. In particular, the estimated impact is bigger when we adopt 
Bahram and Boucher’s methodology than when we make use of all the information contained 
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in the residuals. In this latter case, we find that migration and remittances are not always 
beneficial, particularly for households belonging to the upper quintile.  
 
Of course, these are static results, restricted to remittances. We do not take into account the fact 
that some migrants may remit more in the medium run, when their skills improve in the host 
country, and their wages with them. We do not account either for the human capital 
accumulation that could be beneficial to Mali if the migrants decided to return.   
 
Policy implications are twofold. First, fast and secure money transfers from migrants should be 
facilitated, in order to increase remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa to levels comparable to Latin 
America or South Asia.  Second, in order to address Mali's high level of poverty, government 
and development agencies should take steps to target social transfers and development projects  
to areas where emigration and remittances from abroad are less prevalent.  Yet, the sensitivity 
of the poverty and inequality outcomes to the choice of method calls for further research. To 
this end, specific database are required, namely panel database, following both households and 
migrants over the years, with all the needed characteristics on migrants: age, sex, marital status, 
education, work experience, former and current wages, country(ies) of destination, intent to 
return, etc. As a "second-best optimum", cross-sectional household surveys should at least 
include a detailed migration module recording both past and current migrations.  
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